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Abstract 
We propose a method based on the distance function to empirically estimate the social cost 
arising from rent seeking behaviour in declining industries. Due to import competition, the 
factors of a particular industry undergo losses in real income, and have incentives to seek 
protection. In the case of declining industries, workers play a central role and the losses in 
output due to strikes are used to quantify the social cost of rent seeking. In our model, strikes 
are considered as a “bad” input into the production process. We apply our approach to the case 
of Spanish coal mining. We have estimated a system of equations formed by the input distance 
function and cost share equations using annual data over the period 1974-1997. This procedure 
has allowed us to calculate the cost that strikes have imposed on the sector.  
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1. Introduction  
 
As is well-known,  the concept of rent seeking, introduced by Tullock (1967) and coined 
by Krueger (1974), refers to the use of economic resources by an agent or group of 
agents with the aim of obtaining a transfer from the government. Normally arising in the 
context of monopolies, tariffs, and so on, it is certainly an attractive concept and has 
generated great deal of literature. However, exact measurement of costs associated 
with rent seeking has proven to be very elusive, even on a theoretical level (see 
Rowley, Tollison and Tullock, 1988; and especially the paper of Higgins and Tollison, 
1988). Three decades after introducing the concept, Tullock (1997) stresses the 
empirical difficulty of finding forms of accurately measuring this social loss.  
 
The expansion of international trade over recent decades as a consequence of 
liberalization has meant that domestic sectors have had to undergo adjustment 
processes due to the increase in import competition. This is especially relevant in the 
case of declining industries in developed countries. In these cases, rent seeking on the 
part of the protectionist lobby can be interpreted as a form of negotiating the productive 
adjustment, and will generate welfare costs which must be compared with “normal” 
adjustment costs such as unemployment. A complication that arises in this context of 
productive adjustment is that the agents affected by the competition of imports i.e. 
managers and workers, have incentives to invest resources in order to pressure the 
government into maintaining or increasing protection. This is a clear case in which rent 
seeking involves social loss.  
 
In the context of declining industries faced with import competition, Baldwin (1984) 
uses a model of specific factors to analyse how workers and managers see their real 
incomes reduced due to adjustments in activity. Under such conditions, these agents 
have many incentives to invest resources in lobbying or other rent seeking activities to 
obtain trade protection from the government.  
 
The form of rent seeking on which our research is focused is that of labour unrest. The 
workdays lost by strikes constitute a clear example of the cost of such activity for 
society. McNutt (1996, chapter 6) establishes two criteria in order to determine whether 
the expenditure associated with rent seeking is socially desirable or not.The first 
considers whether production is altered, while the second refers to the social 
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desirability of rent transfers associated with rent seeking. In the context of industries in 
decline, one cannot determine whether the income redistribution generated by labour 
unrest is socially desirable or not. However, the first criterion is more important, and 
here there are no doubts: labour unrest implies a production loss, and therefore a 
social loss.  
 
The aim of our work is to present and to discuss a form of measuring the cost of rent 
seeking as a result of labour unrest. To illustrate our method, we carry out an empirical 
application to the Spanish coal mining sector. The effects of protectionist policy in this 
sector have been analysed in Del Rosal (2000), while a previous attempt to quantify 
labour unrest has been carried out in Del Rosal and Fonseca (2001). In the latter study, 
the main target was to quantify the effects of strikes through the surplus associated 
with the labour demand in the industry.  
 
We seek to use a more rigorous procedure to measure the effects of labour unrest as a 
form of rent seeking in the context of declining industries. With this aim, we will 
estimate the sector’s technology in order to evaluate the effects of labour unrest on 
production. However, while labour unrest constitutes an “input” to production, it does 
not have a market price. To solve this problem, we propose using the distance function  
(Shephard, 1953, 1970) in order to obtain virtual or shadow prices and thereby 
evaluate labour unrest, which can be considered in this context as an undesired input. 
We follow a procedure similar to that which other authors have used to obtain the 
shadow prices for undesirable outputs (see Färe, Grosskopf, Lovell y Yaisawarng, 
1993; Färe & Grosskopf, 1998), but adapt it to case of undesirable or “bad” inputs.  
 
If firms have to operate with an undesired input which has been imposed upon them, 
as is the case of labour unrest, the theory of production and duality provides two 
means by which shadow prices can be obtained: the production function and the 
distance function. However, the distance function has advantages on both a theoretical 
and an empirical level. If the technology is multiproduct, it is not possible to use a 
production function and it is therefore necessary to use the distance function. In 
econometric applications, on the other hand, the distance function and production 
function are usually estimated along with a system of share equations, even though 
this is not essential from the theoretical view point. This is done either to improve the 
efficiency of the estimation or because a large enough sample is not available (see for 
 4
example Berdnt, 1991, chapter 9). The use of the production function together with the 
associated system of share equations requires the assumption that firms are 
minimising costs, whereas this is not necessary with the distance function. It is very 
difficult to justify the assumption of cost minimisation in sectors which are highly 
regulated, in industries protected from import competition, or in economic activities 
where price controls exist. For these reasons, we opt for an input distance function in 
order to obtain shadow prices for labour unrest.  
 
The paper has the following structure.  In section 2 we outline the main features of the 
Spanish coal mining sector, paying particular attention to the way in which the sector 
has been protected from external competition. In section 3 the methodology used, 
based on the input distance function, is presented, and we discuss its main properties 
and characteristics and address the issue of how it can be used to quantify the effect of 
labour unrest. In section 4 the estimation and the main results are presented. Section 5 
summarises the main conclusions.  
 
 
2. Productive adjustment and labour unrest: the case of spanish coal mining  
 
Coal mining in Spain constitutes a paradigmatic example of declining industry. The 
traditional importance of national coal production has been diminishing to the point of 
losing its previous strategic position in the energy supply of the country, with the sector 
having suffered an important reduction in size to a level where it now provides under 
20.000 jobs and a turnover of around 150.000 million pesetas. However, the sector is 
of qualitative importance for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it is one of the most 
outstanding and complex examples of an economic activity in decline; second, it 
represents one of the sectors which has traditionally been subjected to one the highest 
degrees of regulation and public intervention; and finally, it has a unique importance in 
terms of the social and territorial implications involved, given that it is highly 
concentrated from a geographical point of view and has generated high levels of 
economic dependence in some areas of the country. To illustrate this degree of 
concentration, the central coalfield of Asturias is the leader in bituminous coal 
production, while the coalfields of Bierzo-Villablino in Leon and Narcea in Asturias are 
first in anthracite production and these coalfields account for more than half of the 
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national production and most of the employment in the sector (see Vázquez and Del 
Rosal, 1999; and Del Rosal, 1999).  
 
For four decades, the adjustment process has been continuous, as in other European 
countries. However, the competition from foreign coal has not led to a complete closure 
of of the mines, thanks to an active protection policy which has given rise to a series of 
events that have permitted a more gradual adjustment, such as the nationalization of a 
part of the sector (creating HUNOSA) and, more importantly, the imposition of 
obligatory consumption of the so-called national coal (see Del Rosal, 2000) in the 
electricity industry. With the energy crisis of the seventies, the adjustment process was 
halted somewhat, allowing a rise in energy prices and a certain preservation of activity 
and employment. However, in the second half of the eighties the inability of national 
coal to compete with imports was accentuated by the fall of international prices. From 
then on the prices paid by the thermal power stations to national coal duplicate the 
prices of imported coal. In the face of all this, the productive adjustment has intensified.  
 
Table 1: Labour Unrest and Productive Adjustment (1973-1997)  
 
Period  Labour Unrest 
(% lost days)  
Variation in Employment  Variation in no. of 
exploitations  
1973-1983 1,62 +177,6 +9,4 
1984-1997 2,77 -2053,8 -9,3 
Source: Del Rosal and Fonseca (2001) and Carbunión.  
 
The phases of most intense adjustment have coincided, in general, with periods of 
more industrial disputes in the sector. Indeed, as is discussed in Del Rosal and 
Fonseca (2001), a certain relationship can be detected between labour unrest 
(measured in lost working days as a percentage of the total, according to data obtained 
in the annual reports of Carbunión, the mining management) and certain variables that 
can be considered as proxies for the adjustment of the sector such as the loss 
employment and pit closures. This relationship between labour unrest and these 
variables of production adjustment for the period from 1973 (the first year for which 
there is data available for lost working days) to 1997 is illustrated in Table 1. As can be 
observed, labour unrest is on average higher in the sub-period 1984-1997, which 
includes some years of intense labour troubles (in 1985, 1987 and 1991, for example, 
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the loss of working days was in excess of 5%) and which coincides with times with 
accelerated adjustment in the sector.  
 
Regardless of the reasons for labour unrest in the sector the loss of working days 
implies some costs in terms of lost production. With this in mind, we now discuss how 
the cost of these strikes can be quantified using the distance function.  
 
 
3. Methodology: the input distance function  
 
3.1. Basic aspects of the input distance function  
The distance function is a concept introduced by Shepard (1953) to represent the firm’s 
technology. The distance function allows multiproduct technologies to be modelled and 
while it does not preimpose any economic behaviour (such as cost minimisation) it 
does permit tests for such behaviour. This makes it preferable to the traditional cost 
function in the context of sectors such as that of Spanish coal mining where the 
assumption of cost minimisation is questionable.The distance function can be defined 
in terms of inputs or outputs. Given that we want to evaluate inputs which may be 
considered as non desireable, we have proposed the use of the input distance function.  
 
Our measurement of labour unrest will be carried out by exploiting the duality which 
exists between the cost function and the input distance function. To explain how the 
input distance function works, we provide an illustration in Figure 1 below for the case 
of a firm which uses two factors of production (x1 and x2) to produce the output y. In the 
figure, we represent different combinations of factors (P and R) that produce the output 
y. The ratio 0R/0P is the Farrell (1957) input-orientated measure of technical efficiency 
for the combination P. It is a radial measure and it indicates that one can obtain an 
identical level of production using only a fraction 0R/0P of each input. The maximum 
value is 1, which means that the company is operating on the isoquant and is therefore 
fully efficient from the technical point of view. A value inferior to 1, as in the case 
above, provides us with information on the degree of technical efficiency reached by 
the company.  
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Figure 1: Input Distance Function 
 
Formally, and generalizing for multiple inputs and outputs, the index of technical 
efficiency is defined as:  
  TEI(y, x) = minl {l: lx Î L(y)}    (1) 
where L(y) is the input requirement set, x is the input vector and y is the output vector.  
The input distance function (Shephard 1953, 1970) is the reciprocal of the technical 
efficiency index of Farrell, that is, the ratio 0P/0R, and it can be defined as the highest 
scale (d) by which all the factors can be divided proportionally while continuing to 
produce the same output level. Formally:  
  DI(y, x) = maxd {d: x/d Î L(y)}     (2) 
When DI equals 1, production is technically efficient way. A value superior to 1 tells us 
the degree of efficiency achieved. For example, a value of 2 would imply that half of 
each of the inputs could be used to obtain the same production. The relationship 
between the measure of technical efficiency of Farrell and the input distance function 
can be expressed as:  
  TEI(y, x) = 
1
D I ( )y,x
      (3) 
x1 
x2 
0 
y 
P · 
· R 
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The input distance function satisfies the following properties:  
1) it is decreasing in outputs.  
2) it is not decreasing in inputs.  
3) it is homogeneous of degree 1 in inputs.  
4) it is concave in inputs.  
5) it can represent a multioutput process  
6) it is the dual of the cost function. The duality between both functions can be 
expressed by means of the two following equations (Shephard, 1953, 1970):  
DI (y, x) = minW { Wx: C(y,W) = 1}    (4) 
C(y, W) = minx { Wx: DI(y,x) = 1}    (5) 
where W is the input price vector (normalized by the cost), so that the minimum cost of 
producing y equals 1.  
From this duality, Shephard (1970, p. 171) defines a relationship between the inputs 
and their prices through the following dual equations:  
 Shephard’s Lemma:   x y,w
y,w
i
s ( ) =
¶
¶
C( )
w i
  (6) 
 Dual Shephard’s Lemma1:  
i
Is
i x
)(D
)(W
¶
¶ xy,
xy, =    (7) 
where:  
w is the input price vector, 
x y,wi
s ( ) indicates the input choice under cost minimization given (y,w) 
W )( xy,si =
w
C( )
i
s
y,w s
 is the cost minimising price given (y,x), where the vector Ws(y, x) is 
                                                 
1 For a proof see Färe and Grosskopf (1990). 
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known as (normalized) shadow price vector.  
 
That is to say, the duality that exists between the input distance function and the cost 
function allows us to identify the (normalized) shadow price vector that minimizes costs 
given (y, x). Therefore, the condition of minimum cost is always satisfied with regard to 
these shadow prices. However, the vector of shadow prices may or may not coincide 
with the vector of market prices. Only in the case where the shadow prices coincide 
with those of the market would the firm be minimizing costs with respect to the market 
prices. Thus, with this methodology it is not necessary to assume that the firm 
minimizes costs with regard to the market prices. This property is especially attractive 
when it comes to the analysis of public sectors, regulated sectors, or those where price 
controls exist, given that this assumption is inappropriate. Moreover, the input distance 
function does not assume exogeneity of the market input prices, which constitutes 
another advantage in non-competitive sectors where a certain degree of price control 
may exist.  
 
These properties of the input distance function are especially relevant in terms of the 
objectives of this research, given that the Spanish coal sector, as mentioned above, 
has been subjected to a high degree of public intervention and regulation.  
 
3.2. Obtaining the cost of the unrest by means of a distance function 
In our model, we assume that workers go on strikes to get public sector protection, to 
maintain their jobs, and to obtain higher salaries or better working conditions. Thus, 
these strikes are considered as a “undesired intermediate input” into the production 
process. Strikes (H), which are chosen by the worker, are assumed to be exogenous to 
the firm: 
 
                            y 
Strikes (H)  
             Workers                                                  Coal  Mining   
                H > 0                      Sector 
      
 
                        x 
 
With the purpose of measuring the labour conflict in the Spanish coal sector in 
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monetary terms, we define the following input distance function:  
DI(y, x, H) = minW { Wx: C(y,W, H) = 1}    (8) 
where H is a labour unrest variable, measured by the number of strike hours in the 
sector due to the industrial disputes. The duality of the input distance function and the 
cost function, analysed in the previous section, proves useful when it comes to the 
derivative ¶DI(y,x,H)/¶H. The expected sign of this derivative is negative. In Figure 2, if 
strikes increase, the isocuant shifts to the right because more labour is needed to 
produce the same output (that is to say, strikes are an output-reducing input). In this 
way, distance decreases.  
                x2 
 
        
  
     · P   
 
      
                                  R’                        
       ·         
                                R   
    x2
0                    ·                                 
y0’  
                                                                                                             
       y0         
              
    0                     L1
0
                    L1
1                                         L (labour)   
 
 
Figure 2: Strikes in the Input Distance Function 
Mathematically, according to the envelope theorem ¶DI(y,x,H) / ¶H is equal to ¶L (.)/¶H, 
where L(.) it is the Lagrangean associated with equation (8). Then,  
  ¶DI (y,x,H)/ ¶H = -l ¶C (y,W,H)/ ¶H     (9) 
where l is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions associated with the 
minimization problem (8) require that ¶L (.)/¶Wi = xi - l¶C(y,W, H)/¶Wi = 0. If DI is equal 
to 1 (i.e., if we are in the frontier), the quantity xi coincides with the optimal, so that l= 
1. Therefore:  
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-     (10) 
That is, the absolute value of the derivative ¶DI(y,x,H)/¶H is equal to the marginal cost 
(normalized by the total cost) of an hour of strike registered in the sector. Therefore, 
once the technology is estimated, it is feasible to deduce the annual cost of the conflict, 
where this is calculated as the number of hours of strikes in a year by the marginal cost 
of an hour of strike.The marginal cost of strike hours is an input shadow cost which is 
non desireable. 
 
 
4. Empirical model   
 
To estimate the production technology by means of a input distance function, we 
propose an econometric approach. To improve the efficiency, the estimation of the 
distance function will be carried out jointly with the share equations that are obtained by 
differentiating the logarithm of the distance function with respect to the logarithm of 
each input. A flexible functional form is specified, namely the translog function. With 
this, the econometric specification of the input distance function in the short run can be 
written as follows:  
å åå
= = =
+++++=
n
1i
n
1i
n
1j
jtitijiti
2
rtrrrtr0 xlnxln2
1
xlnyln
2
1
ylnB1ln ââáá
+++å
=
2
ctccctc
n
1i
itrtri hln
2
1
hlnxlnyln îîñ rtctcr
n
1i
itctci ylnhlnxlnhln îî +å
=
+ 
++ 2ftfff tf ffln2
1
ffln çç rtftfr
n
1i
itftfi ylnfflnxlnffln çç +å
=
+ 
++ 2ttttt Tln2
1
Tln øø rtttr
n
1i
ittti ylnTlnxlnTln øø +å
=
+e t        (11) 
The share equations can be written as:  
t
itit
C
wx
ttiftfictcirtri
n
1j
jtiji Tlnfflnhlnylnxln øçîñââ +++++= å
=
+ mit      (12) 
where:  
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y is output; x is the input vector (i, j = 1,..., n); h is the index of conflict; ff is a quasi-fixed 
input; T is a time trend; B0 is constant; C is total cost; w represents input prices (unit 
costs); and e t  and mit  are error terms. e t is assumed to follow a normal distribution with 
zero mean.  
If costs are not being minimised, the error term mit may have a non-zero mean. We 
therefore assume that the mit’s have means ai, and we propose the following 
transformation of the error term, following Ferrier and Lovell (1990): 
t
itit
C
wx
ttiftfictcirtri
n
1j
jtijii Tlnfflnhlnylnxln)a( øçîñââ ++++++= å
=
+ (mit – ai) (12b) 
where the transformed error terms (mit – ai) have zero means. 
 
Also, homogeneity of degree one in variable inputs has been imposed: that is 
i
n
=
å
1
bi = 1; 
j
n
=
å
1
bij  = 0; å
=
n
r 1
rri = 0; 
i
n
=
å
1
hfi =0; 
i
n
=
å
1
Yti = 0; and symmetry: bij = bji. 
 
4.1. The data  
The estimation of the distance function will be carried out for the coal sector by 
aggregating three types of coal: coal, anthracite and lignite. The data have been 
obtained from two statistical publications: Estadistica Minera de España (Mining 
Statistics of Spain), and the annual reports of Carbunión (the employer’s organization). 
The sample period (conditioned by the availability of data) is 1974-1997. The variables 
used are:  
a) Output (Y): production of coal measured in equivalent thermal units. It has not been 
possible to distinguish between the three types of coal due to lack of degrees of 
freedom.  
b) Labour (L): total potential working hours (total working hours contracted ).  
c) Capital (K): this factor, which is considered fixed, has been approximated using a 
Divisia-Törnqvist quantity index, in which the different types of machines have been 
considered in terms of the corresponding vapor horsepower.  
d) Supplies (M): value of the energy and the materials employed. Due to the fact that 
this variable is in monetary terms, and therefore affected by prices, it has been deflated 
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using the implicit deflator of the GNP with a base in 1986, obtained from the National 
Accounts elaborated by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) .  
e) Labour Unrest (H): number of working hours lost. This variable has been constructed 
by applying the percentage of lost days, according to Carbunión, to working hours, 
according to the Estadistica Minera de España . 
Moreover, we have considered the expenditure on the different variable inputs 
(expenditure on labour and supplies). 
Finally, a time trend has been included in an attempt to capture technical progress.  
 
4.2. Empirical results  
The system of equations (11-12b) has been estimated by means of the iterative 
seemingly unrelated regressions system (ITSUR). Since the share equations sum to 1, 
the estimation requires dropping one of the input share equations. Nevertheless, the 
result is invariant to the omitted share equation. Furthermore, an autoregressive first 
order parameter has been introduced to correct for possible first order autocorrelation 
in the different equations of the system. Also, to deal with the heteroscedasticity 
problem, the correction proposed by White (1980) has been used. The estimated 
parameters of the system of equations (11-12b) are presented in Table 2, where the 
variables have been divided by their geometric means. Therefore, the first order 
coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities evaluated at the sample geometric mean.  
 
The coefficients of the inputs and the outputs have the expected signs. That is to say, 
the estimated distance function is decreasing in outputs and increasing in inputs. The 
positive coefficient of aL indicates that systematically too many workers are being 
employed. That is, at the mean, workers are employed in a proportion different to that 
which would minimise costs, which would appear to be coherent in a in declining 
industry such as that under study. 
 
The coefficient of the strikes (H) also has the expected negative sign. From this it can 
be deduced that labour unrest has a negative influence on the sector’s technology. As 
analysed in the previous section, the absolute value of the derivative (¶DI(y,x, H) / ¶H) 
indicates the marginal cost (normalized by the total cost) of a strike hour. 
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Table 2: Estimated Input Distance Funtion (sample 1974-1997) 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic  
Constant   -0.0954 -11.1748** 
Log(Y)   -1.1043 -15.6322** 
Log(L)   0.8856 162.979** 
Log(M)   0.1143 21.050** 
Log(K)   0.4960 3.1539** 
Log(H)   -0.0164 -2.4420** 
Log(T)   0.3924 22.9263** 
Log(Y) · Log(Y)   0.5722 0.3205 
Log(Y) · Log(L)   -0.0539 -6.0999** 
Log(Y) · Log(M)   0.0539 6.0999** 
Log(Y) · Log(K)   4.8882 1.9419* 
Log(L) · Log(L)   0.0881 10.0561** 
Log(K) · Log(K)   -20.384 -4.1885** 
Log(M) · Log(M)   0.0881 10.0561** 
Log(L) · Log(K)   0.0319 1.5507 
Log(L) · Log(M)   -0.0881 -10.0561** 
Log(K) · Log(M)   -0.0318 -1.5507 
Log(T) · Log(T)   0.7080 11.6363** 
Log(T) · Log(L)   0.0220 9.9811** 
Log(T) · Log(K)   -3.9663 -8.6175** 
Log(T) · Log(M)   -0.0220 -9.9811** 
Log(T) · Log(Y)   -0.0197 -0.0674 
Log(T) · Log(H)   0.0283 2.2829** 
Log(H) · Log(H)   -0.0885 -5.0468** 
Log(H)... Log(L)   -0.0151 -1.0286 
Log(H) · Log(K)   0.0828 0.4011 
Log(H) · Log(M)   0.0151 1.0286 
Log(Y) · Log(H)   0.1941 2.5610** 
AR1 (f. It distances)   0.2739 13.5963** 
AR1(f. of L. share)   -0.1536 -1.2699 
(*) Statistically significant at 10% level; (* *) stat.sig. at 5% level.  
Summary of the empirical results 
Equation  R2  DW  S.E. Regression 
Distance Function - 2.554 0.011 
Labour share  0.967 1.335 0.003 
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Given the translog function used in the econometric model we have that:  
H
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)H,(D III
¶
¶
=
¶
¶ xy,xy,
    (13) 
Using equations (10) and (13) we obtain:  
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and, rearranging terms we have that: 
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we finally obtain:  
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CMgH I
¶
¶
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      (17) 
Therefore from expression (17), we have been able to obtain a shadow price of the 
strike hours (H) from the derivative of the distance function with respect to the said 
variable; the costs (C) reconstructed from the information used; and the value of the 
variable (H), the strike hours. With all this, the ”shadow”marginal cost of one strike 
hour, on average, amounts to 1,234 pesetas. From this we can directly obtain the 
(mean) total cost atributable to conflict in the sector by multiplying by the number of 
strike hours; this yields CMgH ·H = 1,876 millon pesetas.  
 
Furthermore, it would be especially interesting to be able to compare the salary paid in 
the sector (known as the market wage), with the wage that the firms would have to pay 
if they were efficient (that is to say, the shadow wage or the also called competititive 
wage). This is made possible by applying the Dual Shephard’s Lemma (see equation 
7). Thus, at the mean, this labour price is 1,576 pesetas. On the other hand, the market 
wage of labour is 1,852 pesetas. Therefore, at the mean, there is a wage gap of 276 
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pesetas per hour of labour. This result corroborates the hypothesis that in some 
industries where rent-seeking is a phenomena, the actual wage paid can prove to be a 
deceptive indicator of the evaluation of the value of the marginal productivity of labour. 
Indeed, import protection, public assistance and union action, all habitual features in 
declining industries, can have the consequence that labour is not correctly allocated in 
terms of price (wage) and/or quantity. In these cases, the modern theory of 
protectionism offers powerful tools to reconstruct more adequate shadow prices.  
 
In conclusion, comparing the values at the mean, the results obtained can be 
interpreted in two directions. Firstly, the quantity of work contracted is superior to that 
which would minimise costs. This result supports the initial idea that in industries in 
decline, the workers have incentives to seek protection for their jobs via labour unrest. 
From these results we can therefore deduce that the assumption of cost minimisation is 
not valid. This should be taken into account when attempting to estimate the 
technology with appropriate tools such as the input distance function. On the other 
hand, the sector’s workers receive a wage superior to the competitive wage, implying 
that they are receiving an effective wage that is above their opportunity cost and which 
thus constitutes an economic rent. As such, the results would indicate that there is a 
certain market power in the hands of the workers and mining unions (see for example 
Lewis, 1986).  
 
All this leads us to suspect that rent-seeking activities exist, and it also supports the 
idea of using labour unrest to quantify the costs associated with this, as we have stated 
at the beginning. Thus, this study provides an illustrative example of how an input 
distance function can be used to obtain shadow prices of factors which have an 
influence on the activities of the companies but which do not have a market price. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Rent seeking refers to the social loss attributable to the agents that spend resources on 
lobbying or similar activities in order to get a certain transfer of rents. Although it is an 
attractive concept, its empirical measurement is at an embryonic stage. In this work we 
provide a measure of the expenditure on rent seeking through labour conflict, 
understood as working days lost, in the coal sector of Spain. While this approach has 
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previously been adopted (Del Rosal and Fonseca, 2001), the contribution of this work 
consists of itsuse of the most advanced tools in the theory of productionto obtaina 
value for the labour unrest in question, without the necessity of having to impose 
restrictions on behaviour of agents in the sector. 
 
The input distance function has been used to obtain shadow prices for non desireable 
outputs. We propose the use of this function due to the number of advantages it has 
when trying to empirically obtain shadow prices of factors which influence production in 
a negative manner, such as strikes, and which therefore can be considered as non 
desireable or “bad” inputs. First, it allows us to obtain certain prices or shadow costs, 
which is especially useful when trying to put a value on concepts that do not have a 
market price, such as conflict. Second, it is not necessary to assume that the firm 
minimizes costs, nor that the prices of the inputs are exogenous. These characteristics 
make the input distance function an appropriate tool with to analyse the coal sector.  
 
In summary, this paper constitutes first step in a line of research that allows the 
measurement, in the context of production theory, of concepts difficult to quantify in 
monetary terms, such as strikes. In a certain sense, it consists of evaluating the input 
equivalent of non desirable outputs.  
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